Many illustrious personalities, from Victor Hugo to Winston Churchill have proposed or even promoted the idea of a United States of Europe. Some of them, known as “The founding Fathers”, worked hard enough to see some form of it, coming into being, in 1956. The basic reasoning of the “founding Fathers” was twin: First, that an end should be put to French-German enmity, which gave rise to three bloody wars in the space of 70 years (Franco-German war 1870, plus two World Wars). Secondly, that European Union should follow the successful example of the United States of America and become a third, federal, world power, as a balance between USA and USSR.
There are two British tragedies that have beset the birth and growth of the European Union:
The first was the fact that the UK was not part of the original 6 founding States (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg).
The second was that the UK joined 16 whole years after its formation.
As a result the European Communities (later called a Union) were organised on the model of a centralised, impersonal, Statist democracy, planned and advanced mainly by French and German bureaucrats, based on the rule of Roman Law. The UK came too late to have a chance to imbue its strongly non-statist and Common Law tradition, into the formation of the “European State” and its capital in Brussels.
Another discordant note, which partly explains the great hesitancy of the UK to join, is that the idea of a United States of Europe excited the visionary enthusiasm of Sir Winston Churchill, but failed to have the same appeal to the majority of British. For them the main attraction was a common market, not a Common State, on which they had many reservations. Frankly, the British Agenda was never wholly European.
Why is this so? For, the UK has never reconciled itself with the loss of its empire and in particular of its American colonies. The “special relationship” is a permanent ghost in the British castle. Their ideal is a three legged giraffe: the two front legs astride the Atlantic and a smaller, hind leg on the “Continent” across the British Channel. John Donne in his famous Elizabethan poem argues that “no man is an island, entire of its own, we are all part of the Continent” but he is the exception, not the British rule.
Now let us come to Greece. We are also of a split national personality. We want to stand astride the Bosporus and Hellespont, one leg in the East and one in the West. Our earliest recorded major war was to capture Troy in Asia Minor. In a parallel way to the British, we have never ridden ourselves of the ghost of the Byzantine Empire.
Joining the European Communities was the top Agenda for Constantine Karamanlis, the great Greek statesman. But he, too, had his own interpretation of the European Agenda. He primarily wanted us to join Europe because he firmly believed that “we belong to the West” and that this is the great clue for Greece’s prosperity, security, political stability. However, at the same time he was a firm believer in European integration and political unification. He was strongly opposed to hasty enlargement, before a “deepening” of political union among existing member states.
The Greek tragedy was – and still is – that a substantial segment of the population, lured in the 80’s by Andreas Papandreou and now by Alexis Tsipras, want to be both, in and out of the EU: In, to lay their hand on Europe’s cohesion money and out, to be free to play their catastrophic fiscal games of State expenditure, to secure political clientelle.
Most of the current argumentation of “Brexiters” hinges on the – somewhat false – spectre of an anonymous Brussels bureaucracy that is not accountable in an acceptable democratic fashion. Actual fact is that it is accountable to the European Parliament, which exercises a strong control over it, but which is not yet a full Legislative Body.
Now we come to the political paradox of the European Union. It started as a formative process, leading to a Federation, with a gradual transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government, following the successful prototype of the USA. The process has been arrested, largely at the insistence of the UK, Denmark and now of many eastern European members, who are wary of losing their economic and political sovereignty.
The Council of the European Union, consisting of the representatives of member-states, remains still the primary legislative body deciding unanimously and only on lesser issues with a qualified majority. One veto may arrest many important decisions. The European Parliament, “co-decides” on some but not all categories of legislation. The European Commission is a pseudo-government, whose only power is to propose legislation and/or administrative action to the Council.
However, the European Council is not accountable to the European Parliament but to the 28 national Parliaments or Assemblies and its powers are limited by the national prerogative of veto. This is the democratic, political and economic oxymoron that threatens the existence of the European Union. Many a wise decision has been thwarted by this paradox.
Take but two examples:
A single currency (such as the euro) cannot operate safely, without a single economic, fiscal and monetary policy, as the current Greek crisis has proved. Just recently, the Greek government has opted for a “more taxes” solution against the Eurogroup’s “less state expense” option. The Eurozone insists on an outside partner – the IMF – to handle a problem which is its own creation.
The current refugee and illegal immigrants’ crisis cannot be handled by an EU that has no control over its external borders and no jurisdiction over national borders. Greece invites inflows and follows a “go as you please” policy, the Wishengrad countries violate the Schengen Agreement and Germany and some Scandinavian countries grudgingly accept some refugees. The EU invites again third parties (the NATO and Turkey) to solve a crucial European issue.
Therefore, much of the BREXIT argumentation is phoney, in the sense that the UK’s distant European policies are largely responsible for the “democratic deficit” and the unaccountability of the indeed “impersonal” bureaucracy in Brussels. It is true to the extent that the EU reduces drastically national sovereignty. But this is a free choice that the British, as well as everybody have made.
BREXIT – if it occurs – will maintain British Sovereignty but at a severe economic cost and at a loss of all British participation in Europe. I do not think it will lead to a break-up of the European Union. Some member-states, who also wish an a la carte Europe, may leave, but – if you ask me – this is a blessing. However, BREXIT poses once more the basic, existential dilemma. Europe must either become a Federal Union or continue the impossible muddle-through of the present, which is an unrealistic prospect. Hopefully, BREXIT, if it occurs, may trigger the remaining member-states to move forward in this sensible way.
So much, for BREXIT and GREXIT.
Maximos